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Abstract. Online voting in the UK generally takes place without verifiability
mechanisms, with providers that are trusted to provide ballot privacy and cor-
rectness of the result. However, replacing existing systems with verifiable voting
systems with brand new algorithms and code presents a business risk to elec-
tion providers. We present an approach for incremental change: adding a Selene-
based verifiability layer to an existing online voting system. Selene is a verifiable
e-voting protocol that publishes votes in plaintext alongside tracking numbers
that enable voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the
system. This results in a system where even the election authority running the
system cannot change the result in an undetectable way. This gives stronger guar-
antees on the integrity of the election than were previously present. This gives
an end-to-end verifiable system we call Verify My Vote (VMV). In addition, we
outline how this approach supports further incremental changes towards the de-
ployment of fully trustworthy online voting systems. The paper also describes
the use of distributed ledger technology as a component of VMV to manage the
verifiability data in a decentralised way for resilience and trust.
Keywords: Verifiable voting · Online voting · Selene · Distributed ledger tech-
nology
1 Introduction
Verifiability in e-voting plays an important role in contributing to the trust in electronic
voting systems through offering both voters and observers an opportunity to indepen-
dently verify whether votes have been recorded, tallied and counted correctly. However,
although some current internet voting systems contain some verifiability mechanisms,
they typically do not provide full end-to-end verifiability, as they do not provide proofs
or confirming evidence that supports clear individual and universal verifiability [1].
Adapting existing e-voting systems to incorporate verifiability may require significant
change to the voting experience and structure of these systems, also affecting voter us-
ability. Most end-to-end schemes that support verifiability require some voter action
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such as cut-and-choose at casting time, making the act of casting the ballot more com-
plex for voters. Selene [2] is an exception in that verification occurs after the election
and not at the time of voting. It is therefore a promising basis for adding to existing
systems, as the Selene authors themselves observe. In this paper we add Selene verifi-
ability as an additional layer to an existing commercial internet voting system, without
significant change to the voters’ experience or to the overall structure of the system,
and without any reduction in the level of privacy. The internet voting system is cur-
rently used for organisational ballots for bodies such as trades unions, political parties,
professional societies and building societies. It is not used for statutory ballots, since
this is currently not allowed in the UK. The use of the Selene approach enables voters to
verify their vote by seeing it in plaintext when they come to confirm it after the tally has
been computed. Selene also provides a coercion-resistance mechanism. It achieves this
through commitments to tracking numbers issued to voters, which enable voters to look
up their vote but such that they cannot prove their tracking number to any other party.
Selene makes use of some sophisticated cryptography to enable this, but this is behind
the scenes for the voter. Moreover, Selene does not require any additional voter action
at vote casting time, maintaining the existing voter experience. The implementation of
VMVmakes use of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to maintain the commitments
ahead of the election, the verifiability evidence produced during the election, and the
mixing and decrypting of the votes and tracking numbers at the end of the election.
The VMV demonstrator voting system described in this paper is not a full imple-
mentation of Selene, but rather a stepping stone towards it. It does provide the full
cryptographic functionality of the Selene verification mechanisms. However the system
handles some cryptographic functionality that in Selene is the responsibility of the vot-
ers themselves. Other aspects of Selene have not been included at this stage in VMV
for implementation reasons: our aim is to trial verifiability in a real system, and not all
Selene functionality is required for the initial trials. Therefore the voters are required to
trust the VMV system with respect to management and use of their keys. Even with this
stronger trust assumption, the system allows the integrity of the ballot to be verified,
so that even the election provider (or malicious insiders or external attackers) cannot
change the result in an undetectable way. This is an additional property not present in
the existing internet voting system.
Furthermore the demonstrator enables us to explore and evaluate practical issues as
well as voters’ experience around such systems through real-world trials, with voters
in real ballots. We work with our commercial project partner CES (Civica Election
Services, formerly Electoral Reform Services Ltd), to introduce verifiability to their
existing internet voting system. Their system currently has access to the plain votes and
therefore are trusted to ensure ballot privacy for voters. Thus the approach described in
this paper still relies on the trusted party for privacy. In order to achieve stronger privacy
we would need to remove some of the information that is held (so that for example votes
are only held in encrypted form). At this stage we are adding an additional layer but
not removing anything from the existing system. This is therefore an incremental step
towards a system with full ballot secrecy as well as verifiability. However it is entirely
suitable for user studies on the verifiability elements of the system, and to develop
confidence for CES in the approach.
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2 Internet Voting System
The internet system we are considering uses a content management system to hold the
details of an election, and uses this to drive an interactive website to enable voters to be
able to log into the voting website and cast their votes. In practice the voting system is
augmented by types of non-internet voting methods such as postal, telephone and sms
voting, so that voters may have a choice of channels for casting their vote.
The system does not include verifiability. The election provider CES is trusted for
both the integrity of the election result and for the secrecy of the ballots. Voters are
provided with security credentials ahead of the ballot to enable them to log in to the
system and then cast their vote. The cast votes are stored in a database, and tallied at
the end of the ballot. This provides a natural and straightforward voting experience for
the voters. Standard web security practices are used to protect the system and the data
it holds.
2.1 Participants
The key parties in the election process include:
Election Administrator: the organisation responsible for delivering efficient and ac-
curate elections throughout. This is a party who must be trusted by all participants
and stakeholders in the election.
Client: the organisation commissioning the ballot. The client role is to provide the
information about the election including: the electoral roll listing all eligible voters;
list of choices available for voters; voting rules to be adopted in the election.
Voter: a person who votes or has the right to vote in an election. A voter is usually a
member of the Client organisation.
The internet voting as provided by CES supports different kinds of ballots including:
Xvote in which a voter selects one (or possibly multiple) alternatives from a list of
candidates; Resolution Ballot where voters respond with a vote of “yes” or “no” for
a given question; and Preferential Voting, in which the voter expresses her ranking of
the n candidates in order, from 1 (highest) to n (lowest); partial lists may be allowed.
Preferential votes may be tallied in a number of ways, the most commonly used being
Single Transferable Vote. Several races may be run at the same time. Selene and VMV
work with all such ballots, since votes are encrypted and decrypted in their entirety and
only tallied after decryption. Thus no particular features of the tallying function are
required to dovetail with the cryptographic mechanisms of Selene or VMV.
2.2 Voting Experience
The election is carried out remotely through electronic devices owned by the voters
that connect to the election server through a web browser. Voters login to the system to
provide votes that are stored in a database. There are a number of phases for the election
that involve the voters.
4 Sallal et al.
Setup phase The initial establishment of the election requires the type of election, the
candidates to be specified and the list of eligible voters to be identified. Eligible voters
are provided with credentials with the aim of allowing only eligible voters access to
the voting system to cast a vote. The login credentials for each voter are sent either by
email or by postal service. The system does not use cryptographic keys for the voters.
Election phase During the voting period, the voter uses her credentials to log into the
system through the web interface. Following successful login, the voter will sequen-
tially pass through several web pages towards successfully creating and casting the
vote. These web pages include:
1. Voting page: the voter is presented with a list of available choices, that she can
select depending on the kind of election and on the voting rule adopted.
2. Confirmation page: the voter is asked to confirm her selected choice.
3. Thank You page: the voter gets a confirmation of the vote being accepted.
4. Questionnaire(optional): the voter is asked to answer some user experience related
questions.
Post-election phase The result is computed by the Election Administrator and returned
to the Client for onward dissemination.
3 From Selene to VMV
The VMV protocol makes use of the Selene verification mechanism to provide indi-
vidual and universal verifiability without modifying the core internet voting system or
significantly changing the vote casting experience. By using Selene, VMV fulfills an at-
tractive feature where the votes cast by voters are published on the Web Bulletin Board
(WBB) in a plain text form, paired with anonymised tracking numbers assigned to vot-
ers to check their vote. This contrasts with many other e-voting systems in the literature,
where only an encrypted/hashed version of the vote is published on the WBB. Having
plaintext votes published means voters are not required to trust (or having any particular
knowledge of) the cryptographic processes used in the election to be confident that their
vote was correctly recorded and tallied. Individual verifiability is provided because vot-
ers can check their votes are recorded correctly; and universal verifiability is provided
because anyone can compute the tally from the published votes.
The design of Selene also incorporates a mechanism for coercion-resistance. It
achieves this by communicating tracking numbers to voters strictly after the votes and
tracking numbers have been published. Only the voter knows their real tracking num-
ber, so a coerced voter can point to a vote that is desired by the coercer and claim the
associated tracking number as theirs. To ensure the system cannot switch voters’ track-
ing numbers after votes have been cast, Selene provides each voter with a commitment
to their tracking numbers before the election begins.
Our VMV demonstrator shows some key differences to Selene, as explained be-
low. One key difference is that Selene is a unified system, whereas VMV is a system
designed to augment the CES system, but to run independently.
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We describe the Selene architecture and the key stages of a Selene election, and
explain the corresponding stage in VMV, to highlight the key differences and the im-
plementation decisions taken. Technical details of Selene are provided in [2].
3.1 Architecture
Selene Architecture The Selene voting system is comprised of a number of compo-
nents. The Selene protocol describes how they collectively provide verifiable voting.
Election Authority: EA starts the election and is in charge of administrative tasks re-
lated to the election, such as setting up the election, issuing credentials for Voters
and Tellers, and starting the tallying process. EA also communicates information
privately to voters to enable them to obtain their tracking numbers.
Tellers: A set of tellers is used to generate and manage the election threshold key and
the cryptographic manipulations required by the Selene protocols. Tellers partici-
pate in the shuffling of the ballots and the decryption of the ballots and contribute
to the construction of tracking number commitments. Tellers also create the public
election key PKT , and threshold share the matching secret key.
Voters Each voter Vi has a secret signing key signVi associated with a corresponding
public verification key vki. In addition, the voter has public/secret key pair,pki, ski
for the Selene mechanism. In Selene, voters generate and manage their own keys,
though in VMV it will be the system that manages this for the voters. A voter casts
a vote, and after the election she verifies her own vote.
Web Bulletin Board used for posting election data: this is specified as an append-only
secure broadcast mechanism.
Private Channel for secret communication with each voter.
VMV Architecture VMV provides the same functionality as Selene, but it incorpo-
rates the CES system as a self-contained componentwithin the overall architecture, with
the verifiability functionality provided by another component. A key difference from
Selene is that VMV provides the cryptographic functionality (key generation, signing,
and decryption) for the voters, rather than have the voters do this themselves. This is
managed independently of the Election Authority CES, in this case by the project team
at University of Surrey. This separation means that CES continue to have access to the
votes and hence have responsibility for voter privacy, however they do not have con-
trol over the cryptographic functions that underpin the integrity and verifiability of the
election. Conversely the verifiability layer does not have access to the plain votes when
cast.
Election Authority CES takes the role of EA, the election authority that runs the elec-
tion. CES is responsible for setting up the election, managing the list of eligible
voters, issuing their voting credentials, providing the voting website for voters to
cast their votes, and managing all communication with voters.
Tellers A set of tellers are used to generate and manage the election threshold key and
the cryptographic manipulations required by the Selene protocols. We have chosen
to use Verificatum [3], with four nodes.
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Voters Interactions with voters are typically via email and via a web browser to the
voting website. In VMV voters are not asked to manage their keys. Instead VMV
manages this for the voters, and voters access the necessary cryptographic functions
with credentials they are provided with.
Voter Key Management This is a component which manages voters’ keys and their
application. This is not run by CES but by an independent party (in this case the
project team at University of Surrey).
Web Bulletin Board VMV uses a permissioned distributed ledger with a set of peers
to distribute trust, where consensus on the contents of the ledger requires greater
than two thirds majority. For definiteness we use Quorum with four peers. Two
peers are run by CES, and the other two peers are run by two other independent
parties. This means that CES do not have complete control over the ledger, but have
a sufficient number to ensure that the other peers cannot collude to tamper with the
ledger. We discuss the issues around the distributed ledger further in Section 3.6.
Communication Channel Selene specifies a private untappable communication chan-
nel between the election system and each voter to enable the passing of information
that must remain secret. In practice the provision of such a channel is non-trivial
and for the current system we assume that email is sufficiently secure and will not
be tapped or intercepted. In the existing CES system voting credentials are already
emailed to voters, so it is already assumed sufficiently secure to protect voters’
identities.
3.2 Cryptographic primitives
In Selene, and hence in VMV, cryptographic primitives include:
– Threshold cryptography. VMV uses ElGamal threshold cryptography without any
trusted authority. More specifically, ElGamal encryption key (PKT ) is created in
a distributed way over the tellers, following the key generation protocol proposed
in [4], where every teller Ti will have a share si ∈ Zq of a secret S. A threshold
subset of tellers are able to decrypt an ElGamal cipher text with a proof of honest
decryption.
– ElGamal Re-encryption Mix-net. We use the Sako-Kilian protocol [5] to shuffle and
decrypt pairs of encrypted votes and encrypted tracking numbers. The encrypted
vote and tracking number pairs are put through a verifiable shuffle performed by the
mix-net servers [3]. A threshold set of mix-servers perform a verifiable decryption
of these shuffled pairs. Proof of shuffling and correct decryption are published to
the WBB.
– Zero Knowledge Proof. In order to fulfill universal verifiability, the strong form
of the Fiat-Shamir transform [6] is used with the aim of obtaining non-interactive
proofs of knowledge. We use non-interactive Zero knowledge proofs of correct
mixing and shuffling, and correct threshold decryption.
– Plaintext equivalence tests (PETs): PETs perform a public verifiable test where a
threshold set of Tellers are able to test whether two cipher text are an encryption
for the same plain text without revealing the plain text [7].
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– Pedersen commitment schemes: A commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive
that transforms a value m into a pair (α,β ) such that: (i) β reveals no information
about m, but (ii) together (α,β ) reveal m. Also it is infeasible to find an α such that
(α,β ) reveals m
′
6= m.
3.3 Setup phase
Selene setup phase In the Selene protocol, the Election Authority (EA) launches the
initial setup, which includes distributed generation of the threshold election key by the
tellers. On the voter side, each voter generates a signature keypair and an ElGamal key-
pair for use in the Selene trapdoor mechanism. The EA also generates a list of tracking
numbers which are encrypted with the election key, shuffled through a mixnet, and then
published in encrypted form on the WBB alongside voters’ public keys, thus assigning
encrypted tracking numbers to voters. Each encrypted tracking number is also used to
generate a commitment βi to the tracking number for the corresponding voterVi. In fact
βi is the second term of an ElGamal encryption of the tracking number under the voter’s
trapdoor key. When the first term αi is provided to the voter (at the end of the election)
then she will be able to use her trapdoor key to retrieve the tracking number. All the
associated non-interactive Zero knowledge proofs are also published. Technical details
can be found in [2].
VMV setup phase As mentioned earlier, the main goal of VMV is to add end-to-end
verifiability to the already existing internet voting system while maintaining the voter
experience and not burdening the voter with additional overhead. In practice this means
that we cannot expect voters to generate and manage their own keys for participating
in the election. Selene is not explicit on the assumed public key infrastructure for vot-
ers, though the normal expectation would be that only voters know their secret keys.
In our case we will have VMV generate and manage the voters’ signature and trapdoor
keys in the setup phase, with voters accessing them as required by means of their cre-
dentials. We consider this an acceptable solution from the usability point of view. This
is also the approach taken for example in the Belenios verifiable online voting system
[8] for signature keys: Belenios manages the voter signing keys by having a registrar
generate the voters’ keys and giving the voters a short id in the invitation to vote that
they can use to access the key and use it within the browser or voting application to
sign. Voters need login credentials. Therefore, in contrast to Selene, the election setup
in the VMV does not involve the voter in the process of initialising the voter crypto-
graphic primitives. This means the voter will not hold her secret keys. Instead these are
managed by VMV which means that VMV must be a trusted party with respect to the
secrecy of the voters’ private keys. At the end of this phase, the VMV publishes list
of encrypted tracking numbers, voter’s public key, and commitments (βi ), to the per-
missioned distributed ledger (Quorum). The election key and list of tracking numbers
are also published, alongside the appropriate zero knowledge proofs. This phase also
involved the EA emailing each voter her voting credentials.
Setup phase technical details In VMV, as in Selene, there are several keys that need
to be generated prior to the election. These keys include: voter’s signing keys, threshold
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election key, and voters’ trapdoor keys. VMV uses a parameter initiator system (PI) to
generate ElGamal signing key pair (signi,vki), where signi is the voter’s signature key
and vki is the public verifier key. Here signatures can be produced for the voter Vi that
can be verified via vki. In addition, we assume that PI is able to generate a secret key
ski and public key (voter’s trap door key) PKi for each voter Vi, where PKi = g
ski .
Tellers are responsible for generating the threshold election key (PKT ). The election
public key PKT is created in a distributed way by the election tellers using the key
generation protocol proposed in Pedersen [4]. In this protocol, every teller Tj will have
a share s j ∈ Zq of a secret S.
As the values PK j = g
s j are made public, every teller is committed to these values.
So the encryption key PKT for the election is computed as:
PKT = Π
n
j=1PK j (1)
where n is the number of tellers. The calculated encryption public key PKT is sent to all
tellers. Note that no single teller can recover the secret key S = Σnj=1s j.
We turn now to the generation of an encrypted tracking number for each registered
voter. The voters are assigned encrypted tracking numbers as follows:
1. The set of tracking numbers ni for the registered voters are imported from the elec-
tion database. These tracking numbers are a sparse selection of integers.
2. gni is calculated for each imported tracking number ni in order to make sure that
the tracking number falls in the appropriate subgroup.
3. Tracking numbers gni are encrypted using the encryption key PKT .
4. The Sako-Kilian protocol [5] is used to re-encrypt and shuffle the set of encrypted
tracking numbers (gni)pkT . The resulting shuffled list is then assigned to the voters,
so that each voter is associated with a unique secret encrypted tracker {gnpi(i)}PKT ,
where pi is the permutation induced by the shuffle.
At this stage, trap door commitments that open to a unique tracker are also calcu-
lated for each voter More specifically, the tracking number commitment for each voter
is generated by tellers as follows:
1. Generate a random ri for each voter i by combining random values ri, j generated
by each teller j for voter i, where ri = Σ
i
j=1ri, j.
2. Generate {PKi
ri}PKT by each teller j generating {PKi
ri, j}PKT , and then taking the
product. Similarly αi = g
ri can be computed in distributed fashion. The αi = g
ri
will not be published, but will be privately communicated to voters at the end of
the election. In VMV it is not computed until the end of the election.
3. Form the product of {PKi
ri}PKT and {g
npi(i)}PKT to obtain {PKi
ri
.gnpi(i)}PKT
4. Apply threshold decryption to reveal the commitment βi = PKi
ri
.g
npi(i) . The com-
mitment βi is published.
Furthermore, the distributed ledger will be initialized with an initialisation block, that
will serve as the genesis block, of the chain. The initialisation block does not contain any
votes, but instead it contains all the information of the election, including the election
public key, the set of valid choices the voters can choose from and so on. This way
a Distributed Ledger (DL) is tied to a specific election and all the system parameters
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become part of the DL and thus dispute over them is prevented. Security credentials will
be generated and given to the Trustees in order to allow them to join the permissioned
network and participate in maintaining the DL. Before the voting phase starts, a tuple
of terms are posted to the DL for each voter Vi:
(vki , PKi , {g
npi(i)}PKT , βi) (2)
3.4 Election phase
Selene election phase Selene allows each voter to create a vote corresponding to her
choice. The voter encrypts and then signs her ballot. The encrypted ballot is then pub-
lished to the WBB alongside the voter’s tuple of terms shown in Line 2. The signature
on the encrypted vote ensures that the vote is recorded against the correct information.
VMV election phase The voter interacts with the CES internet voting system, provid-
ing her credentials to gain access to the voting site, and then casting her ballot. The cast
ballot is stored in plaintext in the CES election database. The voter is not involved with
the voter-side cryptographic actions of Selene in the voting phase. Instead, the voter’s
task during the voting phase is to create and cast a ballot in the usual way. VMV will
use the vote held in the CES system to produce a Selene signed encrypted vote at a later
stage.
In fact there is a choice to be made here: the signed encrypted vote could be created
at vote time, and could be posted on theWBB when it is cast. This would provide public
real-time information regarding the turnout for the election (though not running totals),
which may or may not be desirable depending on the requirements and constraints of
the election. Even if the signed encrypted vote is obtained at vote time it may therefore
be preferred not to post it on the WBB until after voting has completed. In VMV we
do not look to publish in real-time, and for pragmatic reasons to minimise interaction
between VMV and the CES system during the voting phase we sign and encrypt the
votes after voting has finished.
3.5 Post-election phase
Selene post-election phase At the end of the voting phase, each encrypted vote has
its signature removed, and is then paired with its corresponding encrypted tracking
number. The pairs are passed through the mixnet in order to shuffle them. The election
tellers then decrypt the votes and tracking numbers. By the end of this process, tracking
numbers alongside plain text votes are posted to the WBB, so each voter will ultimately
be able to check her vote simply by checking the vote against her tracking number.
After all the votes and tracking numbers have been published, Selene notifies the
voters of the information they require to open their commitment to the tracker. Specifi-
cally Selene sends the value αi to voterVi over a private communication channel, where
αi is the first term of the ElGamal encryption of the tracking number under the voter’s
public key, that matches the βi previously provided. This enables the voter to decrypt
(αi,βi) and obtain their tracking number, which allows them to check their vote.
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In case of coercion, the voter can select a published tracking number n′ for a vote
compatible with the coercer’s demand that she wishes to claim to have cast. Selene
provides a way in which she can use her private key together with βi and n
′ to obtain a
value α ′i such that (α
′
i ,βi) decrypts to n
′. She can then claim to the coercer that α ′i was
the opening value she received,
VMV post-election phase When the election finishes, VMV encrypts each cast ballot
using the election key, and then signs the encrypted ballot using the voter’s signing key.
After mixing and shuffling the encrypted ballot via the tellers, the encrypted vote will
be published to the permissioned distributed ledger alongside the encrypted tracking
number, voter’s public key, and trapdoor commitment. This is the public record of votes
received (in encrypted form).
At the end of the voting phase, as in Selene, VMV starts the mix and decryption pro-
cess where each encrypted vote alongside its corresponding encrypted tracking number
are mixed, shuffled, and decrypted by the election tellers. By the end of this process,
tracking numbers alongside plain text votes are posted to the permissioned ledger.
After the votes and tracking numbers have been published, the VMV trial version
sends the αi term to the voter Vi via e-mail. On receiving the α term, the voter can ac-
cess her tracking number via a call to VMV to apply her trapdoor key to (αi,βi). This
enables her to identify her vote on the ledger. For this initial trial, we do not offer the
functionality for generating a fake αi
′ term. This would be straightforward to incorpo-
rate from a technical point of view but was not the focus of the original trials, and we
did not wish to overload the voters at the initial stage with the additional overhead of
understanding a coercion-resistance mechanism.
Post-election phase technical details After the election finishes, VMV carries out
several steps to produce the final result
For each cast ballot:
1. Encrypt the ballot and sign it, obtaining signvi({Votei}PKT ).
2. Create a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of the knowledge of the plaintext
(Πi), and attach it to the encrypted ballot. Furthermore, this proof also contains the
voter’s verification key, ensuring the proof is valid only for this verification key.
3. The signed encrypted ballot and the NIZKP are posted on the ledger alongside the
previously published encrypted tracking number, tracking number commitment,
and voter’s identity (PKi), as shown in Line 3. This is the only information pub-
lished on the ledger; in particular the standard voting information collected by the
election system is not published.
(vki,PKi,{g
npi(i)}PKT ,βi,signvi({Vote}PKT ),Πi) (3)
Mix and decryption For each voter Vi, the encrypted tracking number and encrypted
vote are extracted to give a pair of the form:
({gnpi(i)}PKT ,{votei}PKT ) (4)
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The set of these is put through a verifiable shuffle performed by the mixnet [3], and then
a threshold set of tellers perform a verifiable decryption of these shuffled pairs. Proof of
shuffling and correct decryption are uploaded on the WBB. After decryption, the pairs
(npi(i),votei) are published on the WBB.
Tracking number retrieval Once the grace period has ended, each voter Vi will be
sent the αi described in Section 3. The received αi can be combined with the βi term to
reconstruct the tracking number encrypted under the voter’s public key PKi.
(αi,βi) = {g
npi(i)}PKi (5)
Voter Vi can request VMV to use her secret key to decrypt and retrieve the g
npi(i) , and
thus obtain the tracker npi(i), which she can then use to look up her vote on the Ledger.
3.6 Distributed ledger
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) offer an approach to implementing aWeb Bul-
letin Board. They provide tamper-proof immutable records which can be appended to,
but once they are on the ledger then entries cannot be changed. These are precisely the
requirements on a Web Bulletin Board.
Different approaches to DLTs require different trust assumptions, but the intention
is that they are controlled in a distributed manner by a set of trustees who collectively
provide the assurance in the ledger and agree on its contents.
Typically information is added to the DLT in blocks, hence the term blockchain is
commonly used to refer to this technology, though it is most commonly associated with
one specific approach pioneered by Bitcoin [9]. The tamper-proof property is provided
by cryptographic assurances, whereby blocks are linked cryptographically so that any
change in a block means that the cryptographic checks will then fail. The first block in
the blockchain is known as the genesis block and has no references to previous blocks.
There are several possible types of DLs, which differentiate mainly with respect to
two orthogonal characteristics: (i) access to the DL and (ii) consensus protocol. As re-
gards access to the DL, there exist two kinds of DL:
Permissionless DL public ledger is not owned by any single authority and, in principle,
anyone can make "legitimate" (i.e. well-formed according to the rules for the data held
by DL) additions to the DL. A permissionless DL is maintained over a public peer-
to-peer network where every node in the network is allowed to contribute data to the
ledger and to have identical copies of the ledger [10]. This creates an effective mecha-
nism to obtain censorship resistance, i.e. no actor can prevent a legitimate transaction
from being added to the ledger. Participants maintain the integrity through reaching a
consensus about its state. Bitcoin blockchain is an example of a permissionless DL [11].
Permissioned DL Permissioned ledgers may have one or many owners, and typically
allow several Trustees to add items to the ledger (individually or collectively) and to
maintain it jointly. The trustees are collectively trusted, in that if a majority (simple, or
two-thirds, depending on the protocols) of trustees follow the consensus protocol, then
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the distributed ledger has the required properties, even if the remaining trustees behave
dishonestly or are attacked. When a new record is added, the ledger’s integrity is typi-
cally checked by a limited consensus process which is carried out by the trustees. This
makes maintaining a shared record simpler and faster (i.e. requiring less computational
resources) than the consensus process used by the Permissionless DLs. Development
platforms such as Monax8, Multichain9, and Quorum10 allow to build and manage per-
missioned ledgers. If more than one individual is allowed to add information to the DL,
a consensus protocol is employed to decide which block (among those produced by
various nodes in the DL) will be the next to be added to the ledger.
In VMV, we use a permissioned distributed ledger as the appropriate design choice,
due to the fact that the DL will be purpose-build for the election. In terms of the decision
to have trusted authorities, the election already requires an Election Authority to man-
age the electoral roll, establish the election and ultimately take responsibility for the re-
sult. There is no need for individuals other than the ones responsible for conducting the
election (which are already trusted in the current setting of VMV) to be allowed write
access to the ledger. Therefore, malicious nodes are prevented to take part in the DL’s
network which maximises the security awareness in the VMV. Furthermore, permis-
sioned DLs allow faster and lighter consensus than the permissionless DL. In contrast,
there is less control over consistency in permissionless public ledgers, since they sup-
port eventual consensus where forks are possible and eventually resolved, such as the
branch rule of Bitcoin. The Quorum DL platform will be used to create a permissioned
distributed ledger in the VMV. Quorum is an enterprise-focused version of Ethereum
which offers high speed and high throughput processing of private transactions within a
permissioned group of known participants. In VMV, the known participants in the per-
missioned group will include the election authority and other trusted parties such that
they cannot violate the integrity of the Ledger unless a threshold of them collude.
As regards to the consensus protocol, the main approaches are :
Proof of work(POW): The next block to be added is the one produced by the first
node to solve a computationally intensive cryptopuzzle linking, via cryptographic
hashing.
Proof of stake(POS): The next block is chosen through combination of random sec-
tion and wealth (the so-called "stake") of the node that creates it.
Proof of Authority(POA): Transactions and blocks are validated by approved accounts,
known as validators. Typically, in POA nodes have to earn the right to become val-
idators through reputation (a backlog history of validating "good" blocks). By at-
taching reputation to identity, validators are incentivised to uphold the transaction
process, as they do not wish to have their identities attached to a negative reputation.
In VMV, we use the POA consensus protocol as it is better suited to the VMV
protocol: trust in some authorities is necessary in any case for a voting system. POA
was first proposed in the Ethereum ecosystem for private networks, and been used in the
8 https://monax.io/
9 https://www.multichain.com/
10 https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/Quorum
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Aura and Clique clients [12]. In POA, the responsibility of block creation is distributed
fairly over the authorities using a mining rotation schema. In this schema, the time is
divided into steps, and in each step an authority is elected as a mining leader.
4 Voting Experience
In this section, the VMV protocol is discussed from the voter’s perspective. The voters
need to pass through several phases of the VMV protocol in order to be able to create,
cast, and verify their vote.
Registration We assume that EA (CES) manages the electoral roll of voters who are
eligible to take part in the election. For setting up the voters ready for voting, either a
complete list of eligible voters is provided to run the election, or else each voter needs
to register remotely into the VMV system prior to the election to provide their details.
More precisely, eligible voters are able to register in the election by simply interacting
with the registration web page which is linked to the parameters initiation system (PI)
that is able to import the voter’s record as well as generate the verification and election
parameters. On validating eligibility, the voter’s login credentials are generated.
The voter’s signing key and voter’s trap door public key PKi are also generated in
the registration phase. However, the EA needs to know where to contact the voter for
the tracker retrieval phase, e.g. an email address, or else the voter will not be able to
have a way of retrieving the second half of the tracker.
Voting Phase Voting takes place over a Voting Period. The voter is asked to input her
credentials to access the voting web page. In the voting web page, the voter is shown
the choices and is allowed to make her selections. Once the selections are confirmed the
voter proceeds to cast the ballot. In this case, a ballot containing the voter’s choices is
stored within the CES voting system.
tracking number retrieval After the election ends, the cast votes, in plaintext form,
alongside the corresponding tracking number will appear on the VMVWBB. Following
this, EA will send the α term, that is generated by tellers, to the voter via Email. On
receiving the α term, if the voter would like to verify that her vote was cast as intended
then she can open her tracking number commitment, access the information contained
in theWBB and check her own vote in plaintext. The voter’s unique tracker is calculated
by a supported web application using the received α term, the public β term, and the
trapdoor key sk. This action is aimed at supporting individual verifiability.
5 Related work
In the literature, many E2E voting systems have been proposed in relation to in-person
voting and internet voting. Examples include Scantegrity II [13], Prêt à Voter [14],
Wombat [15] among others. Helios [16] provides verifiable voting over the internet
for low-coercion environments, and has been used in numerous internet elections for
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organisations since 2009. Belenios, [8], a more recent scheme, also introduces eligibil-
ity verifiability—the ability to verify that all votes have been cast by voters with valid
credentials. Recently (May 2019) Microsoft have announced the imminent release of
ElectionGuard [17], a suite of open-source packages which add verifiability function-
ality to existing election systems. The ElectionGuard information currently available
claims that it provides individual and universal verifiability, as well as support for other
audit features. The emphasis is on polling-place paper-based voting, which is predomi-
nant in the US. However we note that the underlying philosophy, of adding verifiability
to an existing system, is also reflected in our approach.
The voting trial of Scantegrity II at Takoma Park was notable in making use of the
Bitcoin Blockchain to underpin a commitment to verification information by providing
an assurance it was published before the election. To the authors’ knowledge this is the
first use of Blockchain within a voting system. In recent years, a number of schemes
for applying distributed ledger technology to internet voting have been proposed [18]
[19] [20] [21] or launched as systems (e.g. Follow My Vote11 and Democracy.Earth12
among many examples). These proposals typically treat the casting of the vote as a
transaction to be recorded on a blockchain or distributed ledger, and in some cases
casting a vote corresponds to passing a vote “coin” to a particular candidate. However
these proposals typically do not address many of the issues around electronic voting
such as vote privacy, end-to-end verifiability, coercion-resistance, assurance of cast-as-
intended or captured-as-cast, voter eligibility, and ensuring that all votes cast before the
close of the election will be included. Furthermore they might have undesirable side
effects such as exposing running totals or turnout in real-time during the election, or
associating a monetary value with a vote. In some cases, limited levels of information
are available about technical details of their systems so it is difficult to review and
independently assess the technical details of the schemes.
In these proposals, the distributed ledger concept has been offered as a solution
for integrity and verifiability problems. However, there are several security and perfor-
mance issues that occur in the adoption of permissionless distributed ledger with public
peer-to-peer networks, which have not been addressed in these proposals. There is no
clear definition of necessary and sufficient conditions for independent consistency ver-
ification which might cause inconsistency in the distributed ledger. In addition, the fact
that transactions can be delayed due to the information propagation delay in the pub-
lic network that maintains the distributed ledger is not taken into consideration. This
might result in votes missing the deadline at the close of the election. Furthermore, the
performance issue related to the high transaction cost is not addressed.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed VMV, which adds Selene verifiability onto a deployed inter-
net voting system run by our commercial partner CES. Although this is an initial step
it has already resulted in a system which provides stronger integrity guarantees for the
CES system than it presently has, and provides us with a basis for running practical
11 https://followmyvote.com/
12 https://www.democracy.ea
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trials to explore practical and usability issues, and to investigate voters’ understanding
and attitude to this approach to verifiability. The demonstrator has also allowed us to
explore the use of DLT to underpin a Web Bulletin Board in a resilient and trusted way.
Integrity: the system design ensures that even an insider at the election authority
or an attacker gaining access to the vote database cannot invisibly change votes, as any
change could be detected by a voter performing a verification. Hence the system no
longer requires the election provider to be trusted for the election integrity, as it can
be verified independently. Use of DLT trustees means that the authority alone cannot
change the commitments and verifiability parameters, since collusion between a major-
ity threshold of trustees would be required.
Privacy: the election authority has access to the plain votes and therefore must
be trusted for privacy. The election tellers, other than the election authority itself, are
not able to see the plain votes, and so they only have access to the information on the
Ledger, which protects privacy.
Separation of Duties: The DLT trustees provide assurance of the integrity of the
data published on the DLT, and a threshold would be required to tamper with it. The
Election tellers provide assurance of the privacy of the vote, and again a threshold of
those (or a breach of the vote database) would be required to violate privacy. Both
together would need to be broken to change the election result in an undetectable way
(by changing a vote and also the commitment to the tracking number).
There are several ongoing research questions currently being considered within the
Selene community. The current demonstrator will only add the signed encrypted votes
to the ledger at the end of the election, and they will be collected in the vote database
during the election. It may be desirable to publish them in real time to allow voters
immediate verification that their information has been posted. However this may give
away information during the election such as turnout rate, and the best way of achieving
this is currently being investigated.
In practice the system run by CES also allows for votes to be cancelled through a
manual process, removing them from the database of votes. For practical reasons this
must be allowed (e.g. if a voter has had her credentials stolen) and we are considering
ways to do this in the context of verifiability, non-deletion of data, and how to make use
of credentials in issuing replacement ballots.
Our current use of the ledger is as a repository for information, however there is
the possibility of using smart contracts to carry out some of the technical elements of
verifiability automatically, for example verifying the NIZKPs, or in dispute resolution
to carry out some of the necessary checks; this is an area of ongoing work. There is
also the opportunity to use the DLT as a public log of certificates issued by certification
authorities, as proposed in [22], to support transparency and trust in VMV.
The VMV demonstrator system is under development as an open-source project
within the context of a research project on trustworthy voting, and has been undergoing
testing and trials since April 2019. The most natural step-change development for the
system is to provide the voters with the ability to manage their own cryptographic keys,
to encrypt and sign their own votes, and to obtain their own tracking number, without
the need to trust VMV. This would be a significant step towards a full implementation
of Selene. This would most naturally be achieved by a voting app that incorporates
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all of the functionality required, including the generation of key pairs and managing
the interactions with the VMV system, even including the establishment of a private
channel. All of these developments bring us closer to secure and verifiable electronic
voting.
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